

Democratic Values and Support for Militancy: Evidence from a National Survey of Pakistan*

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Abstract

A long tradition of research into political culture argues that greater support for core liberal values leads to a rejection of destructive political activities and reduced support for violent politics. Many contemporary analysts of security policy contend that a lack of democratic values in the Middle East promotes the development of violent political organizations. Unfortunately, there have been few direct tests of the hypothesis that individual rejection of democratic values correlates with support for militant organizations. We conduct such a test in Pakistan using an original 6,000-person provincially-representative survey. We find that strong supporters of democratic values are actually *more* supportive of militant groups. Consistent with the principle of *azadi*, this result is driven by those who believe that Muslim rights and sovereignty are being violated in Kashmir. Our results challenge the conventional wisdom and contribute to theoretical debates on the influence of civic culture on political stability and violence.

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Introduction

A long tradition of research into political culture has suggested that greater support for core liberal democratic values leads to a rejection of destructive political activities and produces a wide range of benefits from resistance to autocratic coups to greater economic growth (e.g. Almond and Verba 1963; Powell 1982; Huntington 1984; Dalton 1994; Gibson 1997; Traube 2008; Kirwin and Cho 2009; Persson and Tabellini 2009). Drawing on this tradition, a major tenet of U.S. foreign policy under the Bush administration—and one that still holds sway among many in the Obama administration—is that “exporting” democracy to regions of the world where it is absent may reduce support for violent political activity such as terrorism (see e.g. National Security Council 2006, Hamid and Brooke 2010). Part of the logic underlying this position is the implicit notion that support for militant associations is associated with non-democratic attitudes, an especially relevant association in the Islamist context where groups often espouse anti-democratic ideologies. What has been missing from this discussion is individual-level data assessing whether support for democratic values actually correlates with the rejection of violent political organizations.

A thoughtful reflection upon the claims made by many militant groups over the last fifty years and on the nature of competition between governments and militant groups in many regions—suggests that theories about the palliative role of democratic values need to take careful consideration of political context. Since at least the American Revolution there has been no shortage of political movements that have rallied their followers to kill and risk death in the name of freedom, democratic representation, and other liberal democratic values. In South Asia and the Middle East today, many militant groups claim to be defending freedom, fighting for self-representation, and mobilizing against what they perceive to be corrupt governments. Moreover, the populations from which these varied militant groups draw support appear to believe these claims. Accordingly, support for liberal democratic values may actually be *positively* correlated with support for militancy,

particularly among individuals who believe key factual claims these groups make about the political environment. Unfortunately, there exists scant evidence to test this conjecture.

In this paper, we empirically test the hypothesis that support for core democratic values is associated with a rejection of violent political organizations by studying Pakistan, a country that is both a significant source of militancy and one whose citizens suffer massively from terrorism. To do so we designed, conducted, and analyzed an original 6,000-person survey that is representative of adults in each of Pakistan's four main provinces: Punjab, Sindh, Khyber-Pakhtunkwa (KPK), and Balochistan. Our survey is the first to measure affect towards a range of specific militant organizations in one country, the first to measure beliefs' about the importance of core democratic values, and the first to be representative of rural and urban regions for each province of Pakistan.

We also apply a novel measurement strategy, an "endorsement experiment" (detailed below), that alleviates many problems that have plagued previous surveys of Pakistani attitudes due to the sensitive nature of Islamist militancy in the country and the prevailing security situation. This method has several advantages. First and foremost, this technique minimizes risk to both enumerators and respondents alike. This concern is paramount. Important as it is to understand the empirical underpinnings of popular support for militancy, researchers have a duty to minimize risk to all survey participants and enumerators. Employing survey techniques that are empirically robust while minimizing risk will become even more for future research in Pakistan as there are few signs that the country's insecurity will abate any time soon. Our measurement technique may also be of interest to other scholars seeking to conduct sensitive research in dangerous areas. Second, this approach also mitigates item non-response and social desirability bias, which plague surveys on sensitive issues.¹ While our "Endorsement Experiment" (detailed below) overcomes these safety and

¹ Work that suffers from these issues includes Shapiro and Fair (2010); Fair, Ramsay, and Kull (2008); WorldPublicOpinion.org (February 2009); the Pew Global Attitudes Surveys (2002, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, and 2008); and WorldPublicOpinion.org (July 2009).

empirical issues, it does so at the cost of precision about the variable being measured.² Given the prevailing conditions in Pakistan, we believe this is a tradeoff that must be accepted if one wishes to study specific militant organizations, particularly in rural and economically underdeveloped areas of the country.

As described in more detail below, we measure differences in support for various policies unrelated to militancy between two experimental groups—those told only about the policy and those told a militant organization supports the policy. The difference between the two conditions reveals how policy support increases or decreases as a consequence of being associated with a militant group, and is thus an indirect measure of support for the group. Unlike a direct measure, non-response and social desirability are less prominent since respondents are reacting to the policy and not to the group itself. By asking respondents about multiple policy issues and randomizing the pairing of issue with group, we can identify both average attitudes towards militancy across groups as well as support for individual groups in ways that are unlikely to be biased by the details of any specific policy.³

Using this approach, we find that support for a set of liberal democratic values—property rights, free speech, independent courts, the ability of citizens to elect representatives, a separation of civilian and military power, and freedom of assembly—is positively related to support for militancy. Moving across the range of the index measuring support for these values is associated with a 4-5 percentage point increase in support for militant groups that have engaged in violent political activity both within and outside of Pakistan. In scale-free terms, a movement from one standard deviation below the mean on the index to one standard deviation above it equates to a 2.5-3 percentage point

² This, however, is an inescapable trade-off when studying sensitive political attitudes in large-scale surveys. Other solutions to the problem include list experiments (see e.g. Glynn 2010) and randomized response methods (see e.g. Gingerich 2010), both of which have their own inferential limitations.

³ For a detailed analysis of the measurement characteristics of our endorsement experiment see Bullock, Imai, and Shapiro (2011).

increase in support. Consistent with the principle of *aḥḥadi* (freedom or self-determination in Urdu), these results are driven by respondents who believe that Muslim rights and sovereignty are being violated in Kashmir and in Afghanistan. Among respondents who do not share this belief, there is a statistically insignificant negative relationship between support for democratic rights and support for militant organizations. Supporters of democratic rights, in other words, are more likely to favor militant groups if they believe that those militants are fighting against foreign forces that are denying Muslims their rights.

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The first section provides a brief background on militant groups in Pakistan and the political claims they make. Next, we provide a theoretical basis for our expected hypotheses, centered around the concept of *aḥḥadi*. We then describe our survey in detail including how we measure the core dependent and independent variables. Subsequently, we present our methods of analysis. We conclude by presenting the results and discussing their implications for the study of political violence as well as for foreign policy.

Militancy in Pakistan

Pakistan has employed Islamist militancy in India and Afghanistan as a tool of foreign policy since 1947 (the year Pakistan became independent) and this continues to date (Swami 2007; Hussain 2005; Jamal 2009). Many of these groups have also conducted attacks on Pakistani soil, both against the state and against civilians they oppose on political or religious grounds. The militant landscape in Pakistan today is populated by groups that vary in their sectarian commitments, targeting choices, theatre of operations, ethnicity of operatives, and political objectives. To understand how views on democracy might relate to popular support for these groups, a nuanced picture of Pakistani militant organizations is in order. This section therefore outlines the major groups asked about in our survey.

Militants Fighting in Kashmir

There are several organizations Pakistanis group under the title of “Kashmiri tanzeems” (Kashmiri groups). Jaish-e-Mohammad (JM), Harkat-ul-Ansar/Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HUA/HUM), and their splinter groups have traditionally focused upon Kashmir and while they recruit within Pakistan proper, their recruitment materials suggest a Kashmir-oriented mission. In recent years JM has become intimately involved with the Pakistan Taliban and has provided suicide attackers for assaults on Pakistani targets and international targets within Pakistan. A separate set of groups operating in Kashmir includes Hizbol Mujahideen, al Badr, and related factions. These groups primarily recruit Kashmiris and generally have remained focused on securing autonomy or independence for Kashmir. They have not been involved with the Pakistan Taliban, and have not targeted the Pakistani state or international targets within Pakistan.

The most prominent of Kashmiri tanzeem is Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), which has operated in Indian-administered Kashmir for much of the 1990s (Abou Zahab 2007). LeT conducted its first attack outside of Kashmir in 2000 and in recent years has attacked international targets in India—the November 2008 Mumbai hotel attacks are the most prominent example—as well as U.S. and allied forces fighting in Afghanistan (Fair 2010). LeT has not targeted the Pakistani state nor has it pursued western targets within Pakistan.

Afghan Taliban

As is well known, the Taliban government achieved dominance over most of Afghanistan in 1996 with Pakistani assistance (Rubin 2002). The September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks made it impossible for Islamabad to continue supporting the Taliban (Musharraf 2006) and when the United States-led coalition routed the Taliban in late-2001 many fled to Pakistan’s tribal areas to regroup. In 2005, the Afghan Taliban launched a renewed insurgent campaign run by leadership *shuras* in Quetta, Peshawar, and Karachi (Levin 2009). The Afghan Taliban, despite considerable organizational changes since 2001, remain focused on ousting foreign forces, aiding workers and other foreign

civilians from Afghanistan, overthrowing the Karzai regime, and restoring their role in governing Afghanistan (Giustozzi 2009).

Pakistan Taliban

Since 2004 a cluster of militant groups whose activists describe themselves as “Pakistani Taliban” has developed in Pakistan.⁴ While we were unable to measure support for these groups due to the high level of political sensitivity surrounding them when our survey was fielded, understanding the differences between them and the Afghan Taliban is important for interpreting our results (Fair 2011).

The goals of the militants grouped by Pakistanis as the “Pakistan Taliban” are focused on undermining the Pakistani state in select areas and establishing their own parallel governance structures organized around commanders’ particular understanding of Shari’a. At the time our survey was in the field these groups had conducted few operations outside of attacking police forces in the FATA and parts of the Khyber Paktunkhwa (KPK, formerly the Northwest Frontier Province or NWFP). This unfortunately changed in subsequent months as TTP-affiliated militants conducted attacks across Pakistan killing thousands in response to government offensives against them.

Al Qa’ida

The most important militant group operating in Pakistan to Western policy makers and politicians is al-Qa’ida, the group responsible for the September 11, 2001 attacks. Former British Prime Minister Gordon Brown summed up these concerns when he reported that “three quarters of the most serious plots investigated by the British authorities have links to al Qa’ida in Pakistan” (Coates and

⁴ The Pakistan Taliban became prominent in early 2006 as local militias established micro-emirates in large swathes of Pakistan’s Pashtun areas. Popular characterization of all Pakistan Taliban as being part of the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) are incorrect, the term most accurately refers to a loose group of local militias espousing a particular view of shari’a law. The so-called Talibanization of the tribal areas began in North and South Waziristan, but quickly spread to parts of the other tribal agencies. Beginning in 2007 local Taliban also emerged in parts of KPK (previously known as Northwest Frontier Province or NWFP). The Pakistan army has engaged in various operations to contend with these militant groups (Jones and Fair 2010).

Page 2008). Important al-Qa'ida leaders remain in the FATA and many al-Qa'ida operatives—Abu Zubaidah, Khalid Sheikh Mohammad, and others—have been arrested in Pakistani cities. Al-Qa'ida operatives in Pakistan have targeted the Pakistani state and executed terrorist plots targeting the West and its allies. The July 7, 2005, bombings in London have been linked to al-Qa'ida in Pakistan, for example, as have at least five foiled plots since 2004 (Jones and Fair, 2010).⁵

Sectarian Tanzeems

Pakistan is also home to a number of militant groups seeking to advance a sectarian agenda. These *firqavarana tanzeems* include the anti-Shia Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) and Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP).⁶ The Sunni sectarian groups grew to prominence in the 1980s and are now a well-established part of Pakistan's political landscape (Nasr 2000a). In the past, Shia sectarian groups targeted Sunni Muslims, although these groups have largely disappeared.

The anti-Shia groups all claim to be fighting for a Sunni Deobandi Pakistan by purging the country of Shias, whom they view as apostates.⁷ Their actions typically take the form of attacks on Shi'ite mosques and community gatherings and they have periodically attacked Christian and Ahmediya targets as well. In reality, a great deal of the anti-Shia violence is motivated by class issues and urbanization. The large land-holding families in Pakistan have historically been Shia and have not treated their tenant farmers well. Thus a class agenda has been executed through a narrative of apostasy (Nasr 2000b; Zaman 1988).

Consequences of Militant Violence in Pakistan

Militant violence has long been a fact of life in Pakistan. Since the earliest years of the state

⁵ Many Pakistanis are dubious about the existence of al-Qa'ida *per se*. All focus group participants in our pre-testing, however, understood what we were referring to when we explained that al-Qa'ida was "Osama bin Laden's militia."

⁶ Many of these groups have been proscribed numerous times only to re-emerge. Many now operate under new names. We use the names which are likely to be most familiar to readers.

⁷ While an exact accounting of Shia in Pakistan is impossible because the Pakistani census is not fielded in areas where Shia are populous (e.g. the Northern Areas), they are believed to comprise 20 percent of the population (CIA 2009).

there have been ethno-nationalist insurgencies ongoing in Balochistan, Sindh, and KPK, some of which continue to this day at low levels.⁸ Sectarian tanzeems (e.g. LeJ and SSP), which were involved in the anti-Soviet Jihad and which are now assisting the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban, have been conducting attacks since 1979 in key districts and cities in Southern Punjab as well as in the major provincial capitals (e.g. Quetta, Lahore, Peshawar and Karachi). In the last five years, these groups and some of the Kashmir tanzeems (i.e. Jaish-e-Mohammad) have been targeting Pakistani security forces, civilian government figures and civilian targets in FATA and adjacent territories under the umbrella of the Pakistan Taliban. They have conducted attacks throughout KPK (especially Peshawar and its environs), and hit Islamabad, Lahore, and Karachi (Gul 2009; Jones and Fair 2010). In the year before our survey was fielded, there 11,429 people killed or injured in terrorist attacks in KPK, 3,788 in Balochistan, 4,424 in Punjab, and 1,791 in Sindh.⁹

Theoretical Overview: The Concept of *Azadi*

Understanding the concept of *azadi*, which many Islamist militant groups claim to be fighting for, is critical for making sense of the politics of militancy in Pakistan. Loosely translated, *azadi* refers to the combination of freedom and self-determination at the level of a polity (e.g. especially Afghans or Kashmiris). The concept is redolent of, but not isomorphic with, what we might term “democracy.” *Azadi* fundamentally conveys a sense that politics should be organized by and answerable to the groups seeking freedom rather than by the government or military forces (be they foreign or domestic) that control these populations by force. Assessing how *azadi* has been used over the years to justify militants’ actions suggests several testable hypotheses about the relationship between support for democratic values and support for militant groups in the Pakistani context.

⁸ A successful ethno-nationalist insurgency in Bengali-dominated East Pakistan led to the creation of Bangladesh after the 1971 Indo-Pakistan war

⁹ Author calculations based on data from the National Counter Terrorism Center’s Worldwide Incident Tracking System.

Azadi literally means freedom in Urdu (as well as Hindi, Dari, Persian, Pashto among other related languages), with explicit reference to political self-determination of a specific group of people. During the period of British colonization, *azadi* referred to freedom from British occupation and an assertion of Indian self-rule where “Indian” referenced the indigenous population within the territorial dominion of the British Raj. After partition of the sub-continent into India and Pakistan in 1947, the concept of *azadi* has been used by a variety of separatist groups to assert sub-national autonomy and/or freedom in both post-partition India and Pakistan. For this paper, the key expression of sub-national “azadi” is that relating to the disputed territory of Kashmir.

One of the principal means for the Pakistani state in this dispute has been using Islamist militants as proxies to conduct attacks in Indian Kashmir and elsewhere (Fair 2011). The mobilizing narrative for these groups has been attaining *azadi* or freedom for Muslim Kashmiris living under Indian (e.g. “Hindu”) oppression.¹⁰ Of course, *azadi* in most of this constructed discourse implies that if given the choice, India’s Kashmiris would join Muslim Pakistan to free themselves from Hindu domination.¹¹ Reflective of this discourse, Pakistan-administered Kashmir is called “Azad¹² Kashmir” (Free Kashmir) while that under India’s administration is called “Maqbuza Kashmir” (or Occupied Kashmir).

Kashmiri *azadi* is crucially important in Pakistani domestic politics and society. Pakistan’s textbooks rehearse the elemental unfairness of the partition that deprived Pakistan of Kashmir.

¹⁰ This is an oversimplification of course. Residents of the disputed area of Jammu and Kashmir under Indian control include Hindus, Muslims, Sikhs, and Buddhists among others. Since violence there erupted in the late 1980s, there has been considerable ethnic cleansing with Hindus moving out of the valley of Kashmir to Jammu along with Sikhs. Buddhists have tended to be in the Leh-Ladakh area and remain so. Currently, the dispute is most intense over the valley of Kashmir, which is dominated by Muslims. The Pakistani claims that India is a “Hindu” state is also deeply problematic because India is technically a democratic state that, while not secular in the American sense, adheres to a notion of religious equality. Nonetheless, due to the preponderance of Hindus in the security forces, this facile and polemic characterization of “Hindu” oppression is sustainable for many Pakistanis.

¹¹ Recent polling results published the Chatham House finds evidence that, in fact, Kashmiris on both sides of the LOC prefer independence from both India and Pakistan (Brandnock 2010). However, few Pakistanis believe this to be the case (WorldPublicOpinion 2008).

¹² *Azadi* is the noun related to the adjective *azad*.

Pakistan's media on a daily basis report on the Indian state's abuses and other missteps in Kashmir. Pakistan's civilian and military leaders alike refer to the militant groups which claim to fight on behalf of Kashmir's freedom as "freedom fighters" rather than terrorists. On February 5, Pakistan celebrates Kashmir Day with demonstrations in Azad Kashmir and elsewhere to show solidarity with Kashmiris living under Indian "occupation." Pakistanis driving to Azad Kashmir do so on the "Srinagar Highway," named for the capital of Maqbuza Kashmir. Pakistan's cities are strewn with public commemorations and memorializations of Kashmir and many of Pakistan's leadership (e.g. the Sharifs of the Pakistan Muslim League) are Kashmiri. Many products such as cooking oil are sold and marketed under the brand name "Kashmir." Pakistan's various tanzeems operating in Kashmir and the rest of India do so under the stated aims of "freeing" India's Muslims from Hindu hegemony and allowing them to join Pakistan (Fair 2011).

The notion of *azadi* also applies to Afghanistan in Pakistani discourse, albeit in a much less intense fashion. In the 1980s, "mujahideen" were mobilized to free the Afghans from the secular Soviet occupation. Throughout the 1990s, Pakistan continued to justify its involvement and that of its so-called "mujahideen" proxies in Afghanistan by arguing that it was "liberating" Afghanistan from vicious warlords enjoying the support of India, Russia and Iran among others (Rashid, 2000). With the U.S. invasion in 2001, Pakistanis have again viewed Afghanistan as occupied and the Afghan Taliban as a legitimate group fighting *jihad* for the *azadi* of Afghans. Hence, concepts of democracy, self-determination, and violent uprising are intertwined in Pakistani culture.

This history suggests two testable hypotheses:

Hypothesis 1 (H1): *Pakistanis more supportive of liberal democratic principles consistent with azadi should be more supportive of militant groups operating from Pakistan.*

Hypothesis 2 (H2): *The relationship posited by H1 should be strongest among Pakistanis whose beliefs about Muslims in Kashmir and India's presence in the region map strongly onto the azadi narrative.*

The Survey

Our survey was designed to achieve four goals. First, we wanted to survey a representative sample of the Pakistani population, including rural and urban areas in each of Pakistan's four main provinces. Second, we sought to measure attitudes towards specific militant organizations in a way that minimized item non-response on sensitive questions which had plagued previous surveys in Pakistan.¹³ Third, we wanted to mitigate social desirability bias in measuring affect towards militants, our key dependent variable. As is well known, respondents in many survey settings anticipate the views of the enumerator and thus answer in ways to please or seem high-status to the enumerator (Krosnick 1999; Marlowe and Crowne 1964, p. 109). These tendencies may be exacerbated on sensitive issues where fear and the desire to avoid embarrassment come into play. In Pakistan, respondents can often determine significant information about class, ethnicity, and sectarian orientation based on the name and accent of the enumerators. This makes social desirability concerns even stronger for surveys studying the politics of militancy in Pakistan, as respondents may be wary to signal pro-militant views to high-status enumerators. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, we sought to achieve all of these analytical goals while mitigating risk to all persons involved in the survey. Enumerators are at particular risk of being threatened by militants, security officials, and even respondents when asking about support for specific organizations. These safety concerns are particularly acute in rural areas which were drastically undersampled in previous surveys, when they were administered there at all.

Working with our Pakistani partners, Socio-Economic Development Consultants (SEDCO), we drew a stratified random sample of 6,000 adult Pakistani men and women from the four

¹³ Surveys in Pakistan which ask directly about affect towards militant groups obtain don't know/no opinion rates in the range of 40% (Terror Free Tomorrow 2008; Pew 2009). Surveys which indirectly measure affect by asking whether groups "operating in Pakistan are a problem" (IRI 2009) or pose "a threat to the vital interests of Pakistan" (WPO 2009) still obtain item non-response rates as high as 31 percent.

“normal” provinces of the country which are governed by Pakistan’s 1973 constitution: Punjab, Sindh, KPK, and Balochistan using the Pakistan Federal Bureau of Statistics sample frame. The respondents were selected randomly within 500 primary sampling units (PSU), 332 in rural areas and 168 in urban ones (following the rural/urban breakdown in the Pakistan census). We substantially oversampled in the smaller provinces (Balochistan and KPK) to ensure we could generate valid provincial estimates. We calculated post-stratification survey weights based on population figures from the most recent census available (1998). Following procedures outlined by Lee and Forthofer (2006), all analyses reported below were weighted and clustered to account for survey design effects.

The face-to-face questionnaire was fielded by six mixed-gender teams between April 21, 2009 and May 25, 2009. The overall response rate was over 90 percent, which rivals the extremely high response rates achieved by the United States Census Bureau. Online Appendix A reports the sample demographics. Full question wordings are provided in Online Appendix B. All variables described below were coded to lie between 0 and 1, so that we can easily interpret a regression coefficient as representing a $\beta\%$ change in the dependent variable associated with moving from the lowest possible value to the highest possible value of the independent variable.

We pre-tested the questionnaire to residents of Islamabad, Peshawar, and Rawalpindi between March 20 and 26, 2009, in order to assess the functioning of the items and the experiment. Several design decisions came about as a result of what we learned during pretesting.

Measuring Support for Islamist Militant Organizations: The Endorsement Experiment

Asking respondents directly whether they support militant organizations has numerous problems in places suffering from political violence. First, and perhaps most importantly, it is unsafe for enumerators and respondents to discuss such issues. In fact, one of our teams in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa was detained by Pakistani militants because they were concerned about their activities.

Upon perusing the survey, the militants concluded that the effort was geared towards asking general questions about policy and let the team go. Had the survey instrument included direct questions about militant groups, the outcome could have been significantly worse.

Second, in traditional direct-questioning surveys, item non-response rates to sensitive questions about militancy are often quite high. This is likely due in part to respondents' fear that providing the "wrong" answer will threaten their own and their family's safety. Third, and perhaps related to the second issue, is social desirability bias. In Pakistan, respondents can discern considerable information from the complexion, name and accent of the enumerator. Based upon these assumptions, the respondent may seek to provide an answer that is socially desirable or most pleasing to the enumerator out of fear, discomfort or other factors.

All three of these factors were particularly intense in our survey, which was 66% rural. Safety issues loomed large as we oversampled Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan, both of which have a substantial militant presence. Social desirability concerns were exacerbated because our survey teams were going to remote places in the country where family and tribal connections are more intact and there is less of a tradition of personal privacy. To overcome these issues, we employed an endorsement experiment to measure support for specific Islamist militant organizations.¹⁴ This approach enhances safety, reduces item non-response, and mitigates social desirability bias at the cost of introducing some uncertainty about the concept being measured, as we discuss below.

The experiment involves assessing support for various real policies, which are relatively well known but about which Pakistanis do not have strong feelings (as we learned during pretesting) and works as follows:

- Respondents are randomly assigned to treatment or control groups (one-half of the sample is assigned to each group).

¹⁴ This approach builds on the technique introduced in Lupia and McCubbins (1998).

- Respondents in the control group were asked their level of support for four policies, which is measured on a five-point scale, recoded to lie between 0 and 1 for the analysis.
- Respondents in the treatment group are asked identical questions but then are told that one of four groups mentioned in the first section supports the policy in question. Which group is associated with each of the four policies is randomized within the treatment group.
- The difference in means between treatment and control groups provides a measure of affect towards the groups, since the only difference between the treatment and control conditions is the group endorsement.

Figure 1 provides a sample question, showing the treatment and control questions, and illustrates the randomization procedure in visual form. Online Appendix B describes all questions measuring support. Online Appendix C presents randomization checks showing balance on observables between treatment and control groups.

The advantage of this approach is that the militant organization is not the primary object of evaluation; the policy is. We expected respondents to be more willing to share their opinions on uncontroversial policies rather than controversial groups. However, by embedding endorsements within the questions, we are able to indirectly ascertain support for militant organizations. Because we randomize both assignment to the group endorsement and the pairing of issues with groups, any difference in policy support can be attributed solely to the impact of the group endorsement. A potential limitation of the approach is that the group endorsement could change opinion on policies for two distinct reasons: (1) positive affect towards groups could be impacting individuals' assessments; or (2) the group's endorsement could be providing valuable information about the policy. By randomizing the assignment of groups to policies we minimized the possibility that the

latter mechanism is driving the results.¹⁵

We used this method to measure support for four groups: the Kashmiri tanzeems, the Afghan Taliban, al-Qa'ida, and the sectarian tanzeems.¹⁶ This required asking about four policy issues: polio vaccinations, reforming the frontier crimes regulation (the legal code governing the FATA), redefining the Durand line (the border separating Pakistan from Afghanistan), and requiring madrassas to teach math and science. By randomizing which group is associated with which policy among the treatment group, we control for order effects and randomize the pairing of issue with group. This allows us to identify effects for multiple groups that are unlikely to be biased by the details of any specific policy, or the information a group's endorsement carries about that policy.

For an endorsement experiment of this type to work the policies need to have two characteristics. First, they need to be ones about which respondents do not have overly strong prior opinions so that a group's endorsement might affect their evaluation of the policy. This procedure would not work in the U.S., for example, if one asked about banning abortion, for which prior attitudes are strong. Second, the policies have to be at least somewhat familiar to respondents since the group endorsement has to be meaningful and salient. For example, in the U.S., one could not ask about an obscure mining regulation since respondents may not provide meaningful responses and endorsements may have limited impacts. While the policies we studied may seem high valence to professional students of politics, they do not appear to be so for most Pakistanis. During pre-testing, we found that most respondents knew about all four issues but did not have strong opinions on them. Our enumerators likewise felt these issues would be ones respondents would know something

¹⁵ See Bullock, Imai, and Shapiro (2011) for a full discussion of the measurement properties of this endorsement experiment.

¹⁶ We did not employ this method to assess support for the Pakistani Taliban. Within our budget for the survey we could only interview 6,000 respondents (twice as large as any other extent survey of Pakistani public opinion). This meant we could only study four groups (i.e., divide the sample into four cells) while getting reasonable precision at the provincial level. Given this constraint, we omitted an endorsement experiment on the Pakistan Taliban because: (1) at the time the survey was designed, the group was not as prominent as it has since become; and (2) there were safety concerns for enumerators as mentioned above.

about but at the same time not have extremely rigid positions, a telling fact since our enumerators were all professionals averaging 4.6 years of experience.

There is empirical evidence in the survey that attests to the validity of the policies as well. Figure 2 shows the distribution of attitudes of policies in the control group. Importantly, it is single peaked on all but one issue, implying respondents do not have highly-polarized attitudes, as they would for something like abortion in the United States. The variance in responses to these policies in the control group was fairly large, ranging from .98 (polio vaccinations) to 1.28 (redefining the Durand line) on a five-point scale, suggesting potential malleability. For comparison purposes the 1987 General Social Survey (GSS) asked whether respondents agreed that “The government should provide a decent standard of living for the unemployed” on a five-point scale. The variance in responses in the GSS was approximately .657.

This approach unambiguously drove down item non-response. Our survey posed a number of direct questions (i.e., without an endorsement experiment) such as “What is the effect group X’s actions on their cause?” Non-response on these items ranged from 22% for al-Qa’ida to 6% for the Kashmir Tanzeem. Item non-response on the endorsement experiment questions, by contrast, ranged from a high of 7.6% for al-Qa’ida endorsing Frontier Crimes Regulation reform to a meager 0.6% for the sectarian tanzeems endorsing polio vaccinations. More tellingly, there were no large differences between non-response on the policy questions between treatment and control groups. By policies the item non-response rates in the control group ranged from 1.4% on polio vaccination to 4.8% on FCR reforms, and from 1.2% to 6.8% in the treatment group on the same two questions. The difference in non-response rates was only significant at the 95% level (two-tailed) for FCR reforms and that difference was driven by the Afghan Taliban and al-Qa’ida endorsements. In

other words, 14 of 16 endorsements had no statistically significant affect on the non-response rate.¹⁷

While this approach is not perfect, the low item non-response rate in our survey provides *prima facie* evidence that this technique reduced respondents' concerns about reporting sensitive information.¹⁸ That the endorsement experiment drives down item non-response, and that there is almost no consistent difference in non-response on the policy endorsements between treatment and control groups, is not necessarily evidence that our approach also ameliorates social desirability bias. Nonetheless, one would need to tell a fairly contorted story to explain why a technique that drives down item non-response so dramatically would fail to address social desirability biases that stems from respondents' concerns about how enumerators will react to their answers.

We also considered other solutions to address the issues involved with asking directly about militancy in unsafe locations. Like the endorsement experiment, the list experiment produces an indirect, aggregate-level measurement of support. Unlike the endorsement experiment, however, the list experiment still entails asking respondents how they feel about sensitive groups, and therefore does less to minimize safety concerns. Additionally, recent studies have pointed to several complications of using list experiments, including design effects (i.e., the inclusion of a treatment item to the list changes the meaning of the control items) and floor/ceiling effects (i.e., respondents may still not reveal their true intentions if they approach the floor or ceiling of selecting the number

¹⁷ The probability of rejecting the null in 2 of 16 draws at the 95% confidence interval if there is in fact no impact of the endorsements on response rates is 18%.

¹⁸ Compared to other surveys, the contrast between direct questions and this approach is even starker. The PIPA 2007 survey of urban Pakistanis, for example, had a DK/NR rate of around 20 percent on most of the questions but for questions about the activities of Pakistan-based militant groups, the DK/NR rate was sometimes in excess of 50 percent. When PIPA asked different samples of Pakistanis "How do you feel about al Qaeda?" in 2007, 2008 and 2009, DK/NR rates were 68 percent, 47 percent and 13 percent, respectively. When Pakistanis were asked who perpetrated the 9/11 attacks, DK/NR rates were 63 percent and 72 percent in 2007 and 2008, respectively (Fair et al. 2008). The Pew Global Attitudes Survey encountered similar problems when they asked (predominantly urban) Pakistanis whether they have "a very favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable, or very unfavorable opinion" of al Qa'ida. In 2008 and 2009, the DK/NR rates were 41 percent and 30 percent, respectively. When the same question was posed about the Taliban in 2008 and 2009, the DK/NR rates were 40 percent and 20 percent, respectively (Pew 2009).

of items on the list).¹⁹

To construct our dependent variable of support for militancy, we measure the average support the respondent reports for the four policies. Recall that one of the four militant groups was randomly assigned to be associated with each policy in the treatment group. Below, we leverage random assignment into treatment (endorsement) and control to measure differential support for militancy—as proxied by support for the policies. The main dependent variable therefore was a twenty-point scale, recoded to lie between 0 (no support for all four policies) to 1 (a great deal of support for all four policies). In the control group, the policy scale had a mean value of .79 (s.d. = .15). As described below, we also examined support for each of the groups individually.

Measuring Support for Democratic Values

We measured support for six core features of liberal democratic societies using questions which draw on the widely-used Freedom in the World (FIW) survey (Freedom House 2011).

Free Speech. “How important is it that individuals be able to express their political views, even though other people may not agree with them?” (Freedom of Expression and Beliefs module)

Independent Courts. “How important is it for you to live in a country where the decisions of the courts are independent from influence by political and military authorities?” (Rule of Law module)

Freedom of Assembly. “How important is it that individuals be able to meet with others to work on political issues?” (Associational and Organizational Rights module)

Being Governed by Elected Representatives. “How important is it for you to live in a country that is governed by representatives elected by the people?” (Functioning of Government module)

Property Rights. “How important is it that individual property rights be secure? This means the state cannot take away their things without proper court proceedings.” (Personal Autonomy and

¹⁹ See Glynn (2009) and Imai and Blair (2011) for more details.

Individual Rights module)

Having Civilian Control over the Military. “The 1973 Constitution of Pakistan says civilians should control the military. This means the military cannot take action without orders from civilian leaders. In your opinion, how much control should civilians have over the military?” (Functioning of Government module)

The first five items were measured on a five-point scale (“extremely important,” “very important,” “moderately important,” “slightly important,” “not important at all”). The civilian control item was measured on a different five-point scale (“complete control,” “a lot of control,” “a moderate amount of control,” “a little control,” “no control at all”).

As shown in Table 1, about half of respondents select the most-democratic response (“extremely important” or “complete control”) and very few select response options in the bottom categories expressing little support for democracy. Accordingly, we bifurcate respondents into two groups—those selecting the highest response category and all others. We also estimated specifications in which responses were treated as continuous measures and we obtained similar results. In addition, we construct a scale in which we average the six items together to reduce measurement error. Cronbach’s alpha for the six items was .75, suggesting a high level of scale reliability. The democratic support index had a mean of .48 (s.d. = .33).

To test Hypothesis 2, we also needed to measure respondents’ beliefs about the status of Muslims living in Kashmir. To do so, we constructed a three-point scale measuring perceptions that Muslims are being oppressed in Kashmir based on two binary indicators.²⁰ The first question asked respondents “How well does India protect the rights of its Muslim citizens in Kashmir?” (response options: “extremely well,” “somewhat well,” “neither well nor poorly,” “somewhat poorly,”

²⁰ We also examined the conditional effects of these two variables in isolation and obtained similar results to using the averaged measure.

“extremely poorly.”²¹ Respondents answering “extremely well” and “somewhat well” were coded as 0 and all others were coded as 1. The second question asked respondents “Thinking about the political preferences of Muslims in occupied Kashmir, please tell us which statement you agree with the most” (response options: “In occupied Kashmir, the majority of Muslims want to be part of India,” “In occupied Kashmir, the majority of Muslims want an independent state,” “In occupied Kashmir, the majority of Muslims want to be part of Pakistan”). Respondents answering that Muslims want to be part of India were coded as 0 and all others were coded as 1.

Control Variables

We additionally measured several control variables, which we include in our models both additively and multiplicatively: gender, marital status, age, access to the Internet, ability to read, write, and do math, education level, income, and sectarian affiliation (Sunni/Shia). These variables have all been cited as potential correlates of support for violent politics including: age (Russell and Miller, 1977), marriage (Berrebi, 2007), media access (Bell, 1978; Dowling 2006), education (Becker, 1968), income (Muller, 1985), and religion (Juergensmeyer, 2003). We also controlled for various attitudinal measures including views on the U.S. government’s influence on the world, views on the U.S. government’s influence on Pakistan, and belief that Shari’a law is about physical punishment (which should proxy for agreement with the theological elements of militant organizations’ ideologies). We hypothesize that negative views of the U.S. and belief in the corporal punishment aspects of Shari’a should be positively related to support for militant organizations. Finally, in the regression models, we also include province fixed effects.

²¹ Prior to asking this question, we randomly presented some respondents with information about the relative strength of the Indian and Pakistani militaries. This manipulation had no significant or substantial effect of responses to this question.

Methods of Analysis

To test Hypothesis 1, we estimate the following OLS regression model:

$$P_i = \alpha + \beta_1 T_i + \beta_2 D_i + \beta_3 (T_i \times D_i) + \gamma_i + \varepsilon_i \quad (1)$$

where P_i is a continuous variable representing support for the four target policies, T_i is a dummy variable representing assignment to the group endorsement group, D_i is a continuous variable ranging from support for zero democratic values (0) to support for all six values (1), γ_i is a vector of region fixed effects, and ε_i is a normally-distributed error term. β_1 represents our measure of support for militancy—the change in support for the policy due to the group endorsement—among respondents who score lowest on the democracy index. β_2 represents the effect of democratic values on support for policies among respondents in the control group. $\beta_1 + \beta_3$ represents support for militancy among respondents who are the strongest supporters of democracy. Hence, the key parameter of interest is β_3 , from which we can derive the marginal effect of support for democracy on support for militancy (following Brambor et al. 2005).

Note that the difference in variances across policies suggests that some may exhibit greater treatment effects than others because prior attitudes are less well-formed. We therefore use the variance of the responses in the control group to proxy looseness of pre-treatment attitudes and account for its influence by weighting each policy response by this variance. Hence, we place greater weight on policies where the survey responses lead us to expect a greater likelihood that attitudes will be shifted in response to the endorsements.²²

To test the robustness of our results, we also estimate a series of more-saturated models, the most complex of which is represented by equation (2):

²² The results are substantively similar without this weighting and so we report weighted results throughout as we believe they more accurately capture the impact of cues on attitudes. The weight vector \mathbf{w} for the four policies (vaccination plan, FCR reforms, Durand line, curriculum reform) was: (.983, 1.15, 1.28, 1.18), meaning that the weight for the control group was the average of these four individual weights (1.15). The post-stratification weight was multiplied by \mathbf{w} to produce the overall sampling weight.

$$P_i = \alpha + \beta_1 T_i + \beta_2 D_i + \beta_3 (T_i \times D_i) + \gamma_i + \eta \mathbf{x}_i + \lambda \mathbf{z}_i + \xi T_i \mathbf{x}_i + \psi T_i \mathbf{z}_i + \varepsilon_i \quad (2)$$

where \mathbf{x}_i represents a vector of demographic control variables and \mathbf{z}_i represents a vector of attitudinal control variables. Note that equation (2) includes not only the main effects of these controls on support for the policy but also the interactive effects with the treatment dummy.

To test Hypothesis 2, we estimate an analogous set of models:

$$P_i = \alpha + \beta_1 T_i + \beta_2 D_i + \beta_3 K_i + \beta_4 (T_i \times D_i) + \beta_5 (T_i \times K_i) + \beta_6 (D_i \times K_i) + \beta_7 (T_i \times D_i \times K_i) + \gamma_i + \varepsilon_i \quad (3)$$

$$P_i = \alpha + \beta_1 T_i + \beta_2 D_i + \beta_3 K_i + \beta_4 (T_i \times D_i) + \beta_5 (T_i \times K_i) + \beta_6 (D_i \times K_i) + \beta_7 (T_i \times D_i \times K_i) + \gamma_i + \eta \mathbf{x}_i + \lambda \mathbf{z}_i + \xi T_i \mathbf{x}_i + \psi T_i \mathbf{z}_i + \varepsilon_i \quad (4)$$

where K_i represents respondents' beliefs about the state of Muslims in Kashmir. As mentioned in the section entitled "Meaning Support for Democratic Values," it is measured using the index based on three questions about each groups' goals. Interpreting these models is complex; we follow procedures laid out by Brambor et al. (2005). The main parameter of interest is represented by β_7 , which allows us to test whether the democracy-militancy relationship implied by H1 is stronger amongst respondents high on the "Kashmir beliefs" index than among those lower on the index.

Obviously, we cannot randomly assign democratic values to respondents. Accordingly, what we report below are associations between support for democratic values and support for militant politics. Nonetheless, one of the main null hypothesis that we are testing—and that is posited in the policy community—is that those who do not support democracy are more prone to militancy. If we find no association between these variables in this posited negative direction, then it means that there is not a causal relationship either.

Results

Consistent with Hypothesis 1, we find that support for democratic values is *positively associated* with support for militancy across all groups. In the first column of Table 2, we present the estimates

from the simple model described in equation (1). Controlling for provincial differences in support, we find that among those scoring zero on the democracy scale, the group endorsement actually decreases support for the policies by about 2.8 percentage points ($\beta_1 = -.028, p < .01$, two-tailed). However, among the strongest supporters of democracy, we estimate the treatment effect of the endorsements to be positive 2.3 percentage points ($\beta_1 + \beta_3 = .023, p = .04$). Therefore, the overall effect of democracy on support for militancy is 4.5 percentage points ($\beta_3 = .045, p < .01$). In Figure 3, we plot the marginal effect of support for democracy along with the associated 95% confidence interval. Confirming the model estimates, among low supporters of democracy, the treatment effect of the endorsement cues is negative. However, strong supports of democracy are more supportive of the policies as a result of the endorsements.

[FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE]

How big is this effect in substantive terms? In the control group, respondents who support democratic values support for the government policies by about 12.2 percentage points more (as one would expect), as indicated by the parameter estimate of β_2 . Hence, our difference-in-difference estimate represents about 37% of this main effect, and is therefore substantively meaningful. Another way to assess the effect size is to compare it to the effect of income—an expectedly strong predictor—on support for the policies. Unsurprisingly, going from the bottom income group to the top income group is associated with a 6.4 percentage point decrease in support for these social services. Hence, the difference-in-difference estimate (β_3) represents 70% of the main income effect.

This finding is highly robust. In column two of Table 2, we present estimates from a regression specification including demographic controls, along with a dummy variable for respondents who did not answer the income question. In column three, we listwise delete cases for which we do not have a valid income response. In column four, we include attitudinal controls in

the model. Finally, in column five, we estimate the model represented by equation (2), which includes all the main and interactive effects. Our estimate of β_3 is highly stable across all specifications, representing between 3.7-4.5 percent of the range of the dependent variable.

Consistent with Hypothesis 2, we find that the positive democracy-militancy relationship shown in Figure 2 is driven by those who feel that the groups are fighting for democratic values. We present estimates from equation (3) in the first column of Table 3. The parameter estimate of β_7 is positive and statistically significant ($\beta_7 = .127, p = .08$), indicating that the correlation between support for democratic values and support for militancy increases by 12.7% as we move from belief that Muslims are not being mistreated in Kashmir and desire to live under Indian control ($K_i = 0$) to belief that Muslims are disenfranchised ($K_i = 1$). Figure 4 illustrates these results. Note that the slope of the relationship between democracy and militancy is essentially flat among those low on the Kashmir index ($K_i < 1$), and becomes positive and steep as the value of the index increases to 1. Columns (2)-(5) of Table 3 show this result becomes stronger as additional control variables are added. The overall estimate of β_7 is stable.

Finally, we analyzed the results separately for each militant group and each democratic value. As shown in Table 4, the estimate of β_3 from equation (1) is positive and significant for all four groups. As shown in Table 5, the estimate of β_3 is correctly signed for all six components of the democracy index, with the strongest relationship being for four particular indicators—property rights, independent courts, elected representatives, and freedom of assembly.

Discussion

To better understand the politics of militancy in Pakistan and to shed light on larger theories about the relationship between democratic values and support for violent political organizations, we

designed and conducted a 6,000-person nationally and provincially representative survey of Pakistani adults, measuring affect towards four specific militant organizations. We applied a novel measurement strategy to mitigate social desirability bias and item non-response given the sensitive nature of militancy in the region. Our endorsement experiment overcomes several issues that have plagued past efforts to use surveys to study the politics of militancy.

Using this innovative approach we find that support for a set of core liberal democratic values correlates with *higher* support for militant groups. This finding contradicts the conventional wisdom which underlies recent U.S. policy approaches to Pakistan and the Muslim World. We measure support for democratic values using an index that aggregates support for six key values: property rights, free speech, independent courts, being ruled by elected representatives, civilian control of the military, and freedom of assembly. Moving from the lowest value on this index to the top is associated with a 4-5 percentage point increase in support for militant groups.

This result may seem puzzling, but it makes sense in the particular context of Pakistan where militant groups (and their advocates in government) have long justified their actions as defending *azadi*, a concept that loosely translates as freedom and self-determination. We find exactly what one would expect if this history were driving our results; the democracy-militancy relationship is strongest among respondents whose beliefs about Kashmir are consistent with the *azadi* narrative and who believe the groups are fighting for justice, democracy, and to protect Muslims.

Moving beyond Pakistan, one larger theoretical contribution is to demonstrate that the relationships between individual values on the one hand, and attitudes towards violent political organizations on the other, depend strongly on beliefs about the political context. This has long been recognized in other settings (see e.g. Prothro and Grigg 1960) but is underappreciated in current debates. Simply put, there is no clean mapping between personal attitudes that seem normatively attractive (such as a belief in individual liberty) and rejection of normatively unappealing

methods of political contestation. In Pakistan, for example, some militant groups' rhetoric justifying fighting for *azadi* has been so widely accepted that it is exactly those who believe most deeply in democratic values that are most supportive of violent groups.

The policy implications of this research are stark. Whether democratic values are a force for peace or for conflict depends on the how people understand the political context. Those seeking to promote pacific dispute resolution and orderly politics in Pakistan and elsewhere therefore need to move beyond efforts to delegitimize violence in a normative sense to efforts to convince potential supporters that it is a counterproductive method. In less fraught political realms advocates should consider that it may be easier to convince people that the facts of the world imply different political behavior than it is to change their underlying attitudes. In Pakistan, such an approach might entail supporting mechanisms to convey unbiased information on how Muslims are treated in India.

Finally, this paper suggests some new lines of inquiry for students of both violent politics and political behavior. For those studying violent politics, the paper highlights the potential importance of learning about how beliefs about the strategic environment interact with deeply-seated attitudes to generate support for specific militant organizations. Future studies can potentially manipulate beliefs about the strategic impact of the groups' actions and measure resulting changes in support for militancy. For those studying political behavior, the paper provides further evidence that beliefs about the political environment interact with long-standing values to generate attitudes towards specific actors. This means one cannot look solely at what is going on inside peoples' heads, but also how those attitudes interact with political structures, organizations, and institutions.

Table 1: Distribution of Democratic Values Variables

<u>Elected Representatives</u>		<u>Property Rights</u>	
Extremely Important	49.7%	Extremely Important	67.1%
Very Important	29.8	Very Important	18.0
Moderately Important	14.2	Moderately Important	9.6
Slightly Important	4.0	Slightly Important	3.9
Not Important at All	2.4	Not Important at All	1.4
N	5891	N	5914
<u>Independent Courts</u>		<u>Civilian/Military Separation</u>	
Extremely Important	54.9%	Extremely Important	39.6%
Very Important	25.9	Very Important	17.6
Moderately Important	14.4	Moderately Important	25.7
Slightly Important	3.2	Slightly Important	10.7
Not Important at All	1.6	Not Important at All	6.4
N	5885	N	5770
<u>Free Speech</u>		<u>Freedom of Assembly</u>	
Extremely Important	48.1%	Extremely Important	53.5%
Very Important	33.3	Very Important	29.6
Moderately Important	13.5	Moderately Important	12.7
Slightly Important	4.1	Slightly Important	3.6
Not Important at All	1.0	Not Important at All	.6
N	5887	N	5893

Note: Data weighted and adjusted for sampling design.

Table 2: Support for Democratic Values Predicts Support for Militancy

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
β_1 : Group Cue	-.028*** (.007)	-.028*** (.007)	-.028*** (.006)	-.026*** (.006)	-.045* (.026)
β_2 : Support for Democratic Values	.122*** (.016)	.098*** (.014)	.096*** (.015)	.093*** (.014)	.092*** (.014)
β_3 : Group Cue x Support for Democratic Values	.045*** (.012)	.042*** (.011)	.043*** (.011)	.037*** (.011)	.041*** (.013)
Constant	.747*** (.011)	.844*** (.022)	.843*** (.022)	.810*** (.029)	.819*** (.031)
R ²	.14	.24	.23	.25	.25
N	5358	5358	5183	5243	5243
Region Fixed Effects	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Demographic Controls	N	Y	Y	Y	Y
Income Listwise Deleted	—	N	Y	N	N
Attitudinal Controls	N	N	N	Y	Y
Group Cue-Demographics Interactions	N	N	N	N	Y
Group Cue-Attitudinal Interaction	N	N	N	N	Y

*** $p < .01$; ** $p < .05$; * $p < .10$ (two-tailed)

Note: OLS regressions predicting support for policies. Data weighted and adjusted for sampling design. Demographic controls include: gender, marital status, age, access to Internet, possession of cellular phone, ability to read, ability to write, ability to perform arithmetic, formal education level, income, and religion sect. Attitudinal controls include two measures of attitudes toward United States and view of Shari'a law.

Table 3: Beliefs about Muslims in Kashmir Moderate the Democracy-Militancy Relationship

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
β_1 : Group Cue	.011 (.030)	.019 (.029)	.028 (.029)	.019 (.030)	-.002 (.037)
β_2 : Support for Democratic Values	.183*** (.048)	.171*** (.043)	.171*** (.046)	.164*** (.042)	.165*** (.042)
β_3 : Perception of Muslims in Kashmir	.082*** (.023)	.067*** (.022)	.076*** (.022)	.059*** (.022)	.058** (.023)
β_4 : Group Cue x Support for Democratic Values	-.083 (.069)	-.103 (.064)	-.098 (.068)	-.101 (.065)	-.099 (.065)
β_5 : Group Cue x Perception of Muslims in Kashmir	-.042 (.033)	-.048 (.032)	-.058* (.031)	-.045 (.032)	-.039 (.033)
β_6 : Support for Democratic Values x Perception of Muslims in Kashmir	-.067 (.050)	-.079 (.044)	-.080* (.047)	-.074* (.043)	-.076* (.043)
β_7 : Group Cue x Support for Democratic Values x Perception of Muslims in Kashmir	.127* (.072)	.144** (.067)	.141** (.071)	.139** (.067)	.139** (.068)
Constant	.675*** (.023)	.787*** (.031)	.778*** (.032)	.766*** (.036)	.775*** (.037)
R ²	.16	.25	.25	.26	.26
N	5077	5077	4933	5002	5002
Region Fixed Effects	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Demographic Controls	N	Y	Y	Y	Y
Income Listwise Deleted	—	N	Y	N	N
Attitudinal Controls	N	N	N	Y	Y
Group Cue-Demographics Interactions	N	N	N	N	Y
Group Cue-Attitudinal Interaction	N	N	N	N	Y

*** $p < .01$; ** $p < .05$; * $p < .10$ (two-tailed)

Note: OLS regressions predicting support for policies. Data weighted and adjusted for sampling design. Demographic controls include: marital status, age, access to Internet, possession of cellular phone, ability to read, ability to write, ability to perform arithmetic, formal education level, income, and religion sect. Attitudinal controls include two measures of attitudes toward United States and view of Shari'a law.

Table 4: Support for Democratic Values Predicts Support for Four Militant Groups

	<u>Kashmeer</u> <u>Tanzeem</u>	<u>Afghan</u> <u>Taliban</u>	<u>Al Qaeda</u>	<u>Sectarian</u> <u>Tanzeem</u>
β_1 : Group Cue	-.034*** (.009)	-.037*** (.009)	-.024*** (.008)	-.021** (.008)
β_2 : Support for Democratic Values	.091*** (.014)	.096*** (.014)	.094*** (.014)	.094*** (.014)
β_3 : Group Cue x Support for Democratic Values	.045*** (.015)	.043*** (.016)	.029** (.014)	.025* (.015)
Constant	.815*** (.031)	.801*** (.033)	.804*** (.032)	.822*** (.033)
R ²	.16	.14	.15	.15
N	5243	5243	5243	5243

*** $p < .01$; ** $p < .05$; * $p < .10$ (two-tailed)

Note: OLS regressions predicting support for policies. Data weighted and adjusted for sampling design. Regression models include region fixed effects, demographic controls, and attitudinal controls. Demographic controls include: gender, marital status, age, access to Internet, possession of cellular phone, ability to read, ability to write, ability to perform arithmetic, formal education level, income, and religion sect. Attitudinal controls include two measures of attitudes toward United States and view of Shari'a law.

Table 5: Support for Six Democratic Values Predicts Support for Militancy

	<u>Property Rights</u>	<u>Free Speech</u>	<u>Indep. Courts</u>	<u>Elected Reps.</u>	<u>Civil/Mil. Separation</u>	<u>Freedom Assembly</u>
β_1 : Group Cue	-.016*** (.006)	-.008 (.005)	-.022*** (.005)	-.016*** (.005)	-.011** (.005)	-.017*** (.005)
β_2 : Support for Democratic Values	.043*** (.008)	.028*** (.008)	.024*** (.008)	.041*** (.009)	.061*** (.008)	.019** (.009)
β_3 : Group Cue x Support for Democratic Values	.013* (.008)	.003 (.008)	.028*** (.008)	.018** (.008)	.008 (.007)	.020** (.008)
Constant	.819*** (.029)	.835*** (.028)	.833*** (.029)	.836*** (.028)	.814*** (.029)	.839*** (.029)
R ²	.22	.21	.22	.22	.24	.21
N	5243	5243	5243	5243	5243	5243

*** $p < .01$; ** $p < .05$; * $p < .10$ (two-tailed)

Note: OLS regressions predicting support for policies. Data weighted and adjusted for sampling design. Regression models include region fixed effects, demographic controls, and attitudinal controls. Demographic controls include: gender, marital status, age, access to Internet, possession of cellular phone, ability to read, ability to write, ability to perform arithmetic, formal education level, income, and religion sect. Attitudinal controls include two measures of attitudes toward United States and view of Shari'a law.

Figure 1: Illustration of The Endorsement Experiment





Figure 2: Distribution of Support for Policies in Control Group



**Figure 3: Support for Militancy by
Support for Democratic Values**





Figure 4: Moderating Effect of Views of Muslims in Kashmir on Democracy-Militancy Relationship



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Appendix to “Democratic Values and Support for Militancy: Evidence from a National Survey of Pakistan”

Online Appendix A: Sample Demographics

<u>Gender</u>		<u>Marital Status</u>	
Male	53.1%	Married	77.8%
Female	46.9	Not Married	22.2
<u>Urban/Rural</u>		<u>Online Status</u>	
Urban	32.5%	Online	7.1%
Rural	67.5	Not Online	92.3
<u>Province</u>		<u>Own Cellphone</u>	
Punjab	55.6%	Yes	47.6%
Sindh	24.3	No	52.4
NWFP	13.9	<u>Ability to Read</u>	
Balochistan	6.3	Yes	70.9%
<u>Religious Sect</u>		No	29.1
Sunni	96.1%	<u>Ability to Write</u>	
Shi'ite	3.9	Yes	69.7%
<u>Age</u>		No	30.3
18-24	22.9%	<u>Ability to Do Math</u>	
25-29	18.7	Yes	76.0%
30-39	29.1	No	24.0
40-49	17.5	<u>Views on U.S. government's influence on world</u>	
50-59	7.8	Extremely positive	1.3%
60+	4.1	Somewhat positive	6.0
<u>Education</u>		Neither positive nor negative	8.7
Illiterate	32.2%	Somewhat negative	20.9
Primary	13.1	Extremely negative	63.1
Middle	14.9	<u>Views on U.S. government's influence on Pak.</u>	
Matriculant	19.3	Extremely positive	1.4%
Intermediate	12.3	Somewhat positive	6.0
Graduate	6.4	Neither positive nor negative	9.8
Professional	1.9	Somewhat negative	18.2
<u>Monthly Income</u>		Extremely negative	64.5
Less than 3000 PKR	12.3%	<u>Believe that Shari'a law is about physical punishment</u>	
3,000-10,000 PKR	53.9	Yes	55.0%
10,001-15,000 PKR	22.9	No	45.0
15,001-25,000 PKR	8.8		
More than 25,000 PKR	2.2		

Note: N=6000 for all variables except monthly income (N=5779), views on U.S. government's influence on world (N=5859), and views on U.S. government's influence on Pakistani politics (N=5874). Data weighted and adjusted for sampling design.

Online Appendix B: Question Wordings

Policies for Endorsement Experiment

The World Health Organizations recently announced a plan to introduced universal Polio vaccination across Pakistan. How much do you support such a plan?

- A great deal
- A lot
- A moderate amount
- A little
- Not at all

The newly-elected national government has proposed reforming the Frontier Crimes Regulation and making tribal areas equal to other provinces of the country. How much do you support such a plan?

- A great deal
- A lot
- A moderate amount
- A little
- Not at all

Governments of Pakistan and Afghanistan have explored using peace jirgas to resolve their disputes for example the location of the boundary [Durand line/Sarhad]. How much do you support such a plan?

- A great deal
- A lot
- A moderate amount
- A little
- Not at all

In recent years the government of Pakistan has proposed curriculum reform for madaris to minimize sectarian discord. How much do you support such a plan?

- A great deal
- A lot
- A moderate amount
- A little
- Not at all

Components of Kashmir Index

How well does India protect the rights of its Muslim citizens?

- Extremely well
- Somewhat well
- Neither well nor poorly
- Somewhat poorly
- Extremely poorly

Thinking about the political preferences of Muslims in occupied Kashmir, please tell us which statement you agree with the most:

- In occupied Kashmir the majority of Muslims want to be part of India.
- In occupied Kashmir the majority of Muslims want an independent state.
- In occupied Kashmir the majority of Muslims want to be part of Pakistan.

Democratic Values

How important is it for you to live in a country that is governed by representatives elected by the people?

- Extremely important*
- Very important*
- Moderately important*
- Slightly important*
- Not important at all*

How important is it for you to live in a country where the decisions of the courts are independent from influence by political and military authorities?

- Extremely important*
- Very important*
- Moderately important*
- Slightly important*
- Not important at all*

How important is it that individuals be able to express their political views, even though other people may not agree with them?

- Extremely important*
- Very important*
- Moderately important*
- Slightly important*
- Not important at all*

How important is it that individuals be able to meet with others to work on political issues?

- Extremely important*
- Very important*
- Moderately important*
- Slightly important*
- Not important at all*

How important is it that individual property rights be secure? This means the state cannot take away their things without proper court proceedings?

- Extremely important*
- Very important*
- Moderately important*
- Slightly important*
- Not important at all*

The 1973 Constitution of Pakistan says civilians should control the military. This means the military cannot take action without orders from civilian leaders. In your opinion, how much control should civilians have over the military?

- Complete control*
- A lot of control*
- A moderate amount of control*
- A little control*
- No control at all*

Attitudinal Controls

Tell us if you agree with this opinion: a Shari'a government means a government that uses physical punishments (stoning, cutting off hands, whipping) to make sure people obey the law.

-*Agree*

-*Disagree*

Please tell us about the U.S. government's influence on the world, if it is: extremely positive, somewhat positive, neither positive nor negative, somewhat negative, or extremely negative?

-*Extremely positive*

-*Somewhat positive*

-*Neither positive nor negative*

-*Somewhat negative*

-*Extremely negative*

Please tell us about the U.S. government's influence on Pakistan's politics, if it is: extremely positive, somewhat positive, neither positive nor negative, somewhat negative, or extremely negative?

-*Extremely positive*

-*Somewhat positive*

-*Neither positive nor negative*

-*Somewhat negative*

-*Extremely negative*

Demographics

Are you married?

-*Yes*

-*No*

Are you Sunni or Shi'ite?

-*Sunni*

-*Shi'ite*

-*Non-Muslim [WRITTEN IN BY INTERVIEWER IF NON-MUSLIM]*

What is your age in years?

What was the highest class you completed?

-*Primary*

-*Middle*

-*Matriculant*

-*Intermediate (F.A/F.Sc)*

-*Graduate (B.A/B.Sc.)*

-*Professionals (M.S.C., M.A., Ph.D. or other professional degree)*

-*Illiterate*

What is the approximate monthly income in your household?

-*Less than 3000 rupees*

-*3000 to 10,000 rupees*

-*10,001 to 15,000 rupees*

-*15,001 to 25,000 rupees*

-*More than 25,000 rupees*

Do you ever go online to access the Internet, do web site browsing, or to send and receive email?

-*Yes*

-*No*

Do you have a personal cell phone?

-*Yes*

-*No*

Read in any language with understanding?

-*Yes*

-*No*

-*If yes, what language?*

Can you write in any language, more than signing your name?

-*Yes*

-*No*

-*If yes, what language?*

Can you solve simple math (addition, subtraction) problems? Like 10 plus 7, or 30 divided by 5?

-*Yes*

-*No*

-*Not sure*

Sex:

-*Male*

-*Female*

Online Appendix C: Randomization Checks

	<u>Control</u>	<u>Treatment</u>
<u>Gender</u>		
Male	53.1%	53.1%
Female	46.9	46.9
F: $p=.99$		
<u>Urban/Rural</u>		
Urban	32.6%	32.3%
Rural	67.4	67.7
F: $p=.78$		
<u>Province</u>		
Punjab	55.8%	55.3%
Sindh	24.4	24.1
NWFP	13.5	14.3
Balochistan	6.3	6.2
F: $p=.72$		
<u>Religious Sect</u>		
Sunni	96.3%	96.0%
Shi'ite	3.7	4.0
F: $p=.51$		
<u>Age</u>		
18-24	23.2%	22.5%
25-29	19.3	18.2
30-39	28.2	29.9
40-49	17.5	17.4
50-59	7.9	7.6
60+	3.9	4.3
F: $p=.63$		
<u>Education</u>		
Illiterate	32.4%	31.9%
Primary	13.7	12.6
Middle	13.8	15.9
Matriculant	19.6	19.0
Intermediate	12.8	11.9
Graduate	6.1	6.7
Professional	1.7	2.1
F: $p=.21$		
<u>Monthly Income</u>		
Less than 3000 PKR	9.7%	9.6%
3,000-10,000 PKR	55.8	53.6
10,001-15,000 PKR	23.9	24.7
15,001-25,000 PKR	8.8	9.8
More than 25,000 PKR	1.8	2.2
F: $p=.31$		

Note: N=6000 for all variables except monthly income (N=5779). Data weighted and adjusted for sampling design.